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POTENTIAL DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE ENTITY
& U.S. SUBSIDIARY INVOCATION OF JAPANESE
PARENT'S TREATY RIGHTS
Eric K. Kawabatat
Abstract: U.S. corporate subsidiaries of Japanese parent companies enjoy the same
advantages of incorporation (e.g., liability limited to the amount of investment) and the
same legal protections extended to domestically-held U.S. corporations (e.g., access to
courts and various legal remedies). Thus, it would be a natural and logical assumption
that U.S. subsidiaries of Japanese parent companies are required to comply with U.S. law
in the same manner as domestically-held corporations. However, some U.S. subsidiaries,
by asserting that they are, in reality, inseparable from their Japanese parent companies,
have been allowed to avail themselves of exceptions to U.S. law under the U.S.-Japan
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty ("FCN Treaty"). Thus, the paradox arises
where Japanese subsidiaries are not required to comply with provisions of the U.S. legal
system, but enjoy the same advantages of incorporation and legal protection as
domestically-held U.S. corporations. A notable example of such use (or misuse) of the
FCN Treaty is the avoidance of liability for discriminatory practices in employment, in
particular, wrongful discharge. However, as this Article explains, such use of the FCN
Treaty is not without consequence, as the invocation of Treaty rights by a U.S. subsidiary
poses the potential danger of disregard of the corporate entity and thus unlimited liability
to the Japanese parent company.
I. INTRODUCTION
Direct investment by Japanese companies in the United States is both
beneficial and detrimental from the American perspective. Japanese
investment creates employment in the United States, while at the same time
increasing competition and lowering domestic market prices, which, although a
benefit to the consumer, may hurt U.S. companies. There are many varied
opinions on the foreign direct investment topic; however, the long-standing
policy of the United States has favored promotion of intemational investment.
Accordingly, the United States has entered into treaties with many countries to
protect foreign investment.' One such agreement is the Treaty and Protocol
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University School of Law; B.A., University of California at Berkeley.
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Between the United States of America and Japan Regarding Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation ("FCN Treaty"). 2
The FCN Treaty, while doing much to promote investment by the
protection it offers, has come into conflict with other laws and interests in the
United States. One issue which has been the subject of much debate is the
conflict of the FCN Treaty Article VIII and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Title
VI 3 prohibition of discrimination in employment.4 This Article examines the
conflicting opinions on whether a U.S. subsidiary of a Japanese company
should be able to claim the treaty rights of its parent in order to avoid Title VII
liability. In addition, this Article examines whether, by claiming FCN Treaty
protection from Title VII, a Japanese company might increase its liability in
potential civil suits seeking disregard of the corporate entity.
II. THE FCN TREATY
Treaties dealing with investments have tremendous influence on the
degree to which investors are willing to venture their capital in foreign lands.
2 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063
[hereinafter FCN Treaty].
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1996). Title VII § 703 states as follows:
a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer--
I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise t& discriminate against
any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
4 For an example of the opinion that FCN Treaty rights do not apply to U.S. subsidiaries of
Japanese parent companies, see Monroe Leigh, Treaties-Application of Local Law to Wholly Owned
Subsidiaries of Foreign Corporation-Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty with Japan-
Freedom of Choice Employment Provision-Employment Discrimination, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 853, 855
(1983) (expressing the opinion that the Sumitomo holding implies "that international enterprises that wish
to take advantage of Article VIII(l) of the Treaty will need to convert their foreign-incorporated
subsidiaries into branch operations."). For an example of the opinion that FCN Treaty rights should and do
apply to U.S. subsidiaries of Japanese parent companies, see Yochiro Hamabe, The JFCN Treaty
Preemption of US. Antidiscrimination Laws in Executive Positions: Analysis in International Contexts, 27
L. & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 67, 135 (1995) (stating, "[N]either Article VIII nor federal anti-discrimination laws
need to be amended to resolve the JFCN Treaty issues. The strict policy of anti-discrimination does not
necessarily have to extend fully to executive positions" and "Article VIII is a good mechanism to bridge
the gap between the Japanese employment practices and the U.S. anti-discrimination laws."). For a general
discussion of the FCN Treaty Defense to employment discrimination, see Wayne N. Outen & Jack A.
Raisner, Multinational Employment: U.S. Employees of Foreign Employers and Employees of US.
Employers Abroad, 586 PLI/Lrr. 577, 583-93 (1998).
FCN TREA TYAND POTENTIAL PIERCING
To promote the free international movement of capital, such treaties must
offer assurance that the investment interest of the foreign person or company
will be afforded legal protection no less favorable than that of accorded
citizens.5 FCN Treaties exemplify such agreements which serve to protect
foreign investment interests of both countries.6
FCN Treaties were first established after World War I.' Between
1946 and 1966, forty-eight FCN Treaties were entered into by the United
States and its various trading partners, including Japan. The proclamation of
the United States - Japan FCN Treaty introducing the terms of the Treaty
expresses its altruistic intentions of
promoting mutually advantageous commercial intercourse,
promoting mutually beneficial investments, establishing mutual
rights and privileges . . . based in general upon the general
principles of national and of most-favored-nation treatment
unconditionally accorded.8
The Treaty is commercial in the broadest sense: it is a treaty of
establishment concerned with the protection of persons, natural and juridical,
and of property and interests of such persons.9
A. Most-Favored-Nation
The term "most-favored-nation" ("MFN") used in the FCN Treaty
originated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.'0 As countries
negotiated for protection of their traders abroad, MFN became convenient
shorthand to incorporate, by reference, the advantages previously granted in
other treaties. MFN was used to combat effects of contrary, foreign policy
retaliation. In the FCN Treaty, inclusion of the MFN provision accordingly
reflects the intent for reciprocal, equal treatment of international trade."
Prior to World War II, the scope of FCN treaties tended to cover only
s See Herman Walker, Jr., Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment:
Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 229-32 (1956).
6 See id. at 229 (stating that post-war FCN treaties were intended to protect individuals and
corporations in pursuit of overseas investment opportunities).
' Id. at 229-32.
g FCN Treaty, supra note 2.
' Herman Walker, Jr., Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, 42 MINN. L.
REv. 805, 806 (1958).
"' JOHN JACKSON HOWARD, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GAIT (A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE) 249-55 (1969).
" FCN Treaty, supra note 2, art. XXII, para. 4.
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international trade and activities relevant and incidental thereto as reflected
by MFN language. 2 In order to address the need of support for the
expansion of international investment interests and broaden the protections
offered, the FCN Treaty also promised "national treatment."
B. National Treatment
"National treatment" under the FCN Treaty is the treatment a country
owes the nationals of the other, such as their rights to engage in business and
other activities within the boundaries of the former, and the respect due
them, their property, and their enterprises. 3 In prior treaties, "national
treatment" dealt with investment rights of foreign nationals and citizens;
however, such treaties did not offer much guidance, if any at all, as to the
treatment of corporations.14
In drafting provisions addressing corporate investment in the FCN
treaty, particular attention was given to the problem of avoiding conflicts
with the laws of the States of the Union as to the admission and regulation of
foreign corporations. 5 Fortunately, in the United States a corporation is
foreign in any given State if it is chartered in any other jurisdiction.' 6 The
solution was, accordingly, an interpretive clause assimilating the
"corporations of the other Party, in any State of the Union, to those of other
States of the Union."' 7  Thus, the FCN Treaty offers assurance that a
Japanese company can establish a business presence in the United States
knowing that it will receive, under federal law, at least the same treatment as
any U.S. company and, under State law, as any company chartered in a sister
State.
III. TREATY RIGHTS AND THE U.S. SUBSIDIARY OF A JAPANESE PARENT
COMPANY
It is undisputed that the FCN Treaty and its protections apply to
Japanese companies in the United States. However, it would be impossible
for a U.S. company, and thus for a U.S. subsidiary of a Japanese company,
to use the Treaty to circumvent compliance with U.S. domestic laws. The
2 Walker, supra note 5, at 231-32.
13 Id.
14 Id.
11 Id. at 233.°
16 Id.
" Id. (referring to FCN Treaty art. XXII, para. 4).
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U.S. Supreme Court affirmed this interpretation of the Treaty's applicable
scope in the Court's decision in Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano
("Sumitomo"). 18
A. The Sumitomo Decision
Sumitomo19 involved a class action Title VII2 sexual discrimination
claim against Sumitomo Shoji America ("Sumitomo"), a wholly owned U.S.
subsidiary of a Japanese company.2" Sumitomo raised Article VIII of the
FCN Treaty as a defense to the Title VII discrimination charges.22 Article
VIII of the Treaty provides that the "companies of either Party shall be
permitted to engage, within the territories of the other Party, accountants and
other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other
specialists of their choice."23 The Court granted certiorari to resolve dispute
among the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal, the Second and Fifth in
particular, as to whether the wholly owned U.S. subsidiary of a Japanese
company may avail itself of rights under the FCN Treaty.24
The Court relied on the meaning of the term "companies"2 in Article
VIII as defined in Article XXII(3) of the Treaty, which states that
[a]s used in the present treaty, the term companies means
"corporations, partnerships, companies and other associations,
whether or not with limited liability and whether or not for
pecuniary profit. Companies constituted under the applicable
laws and regulations within the territories of either Party shall
be deemed companies thereof and shall have their juridical
status recognized within the territories of the other party.26
11 Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
19 Id.
20 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1996).
"1 Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 176.
2 Id.
I' FCN Treaty, supra note 2, art. VIII.
24 Compare Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 725 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1984) (before vacating its order of
reversal after grant of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit expressed its opinion that the
wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary could invoke the FCN Treaty as a defense to a Title VII action) with
Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir.1981) (holding, on interlocutory appeal, that
the wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary of a Japanese company could not use Article VIII of the FCN Treaty to
bar a Title VII action against it).
25 FCN Treaty, supra note 2, art. VIII.
26 Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 182.
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The Sumitomo Court, opting for a literal interpretation of the Treaty,27 held
that Sumitomo, a corporation chartered under U.S. laws, was not a company
of Japan and, thus, was not covered by Article VIII of the Treaty.28
Before reaching the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit stated its
opinion on this case that adherence to the language of the Treaty would
overlook the purpose of the Treaty. 29 The Second Circuit opined that denial
of protection under Article VIII would contravene the purpose of allowing
the Japanese company to control its investment interest in the U.S.30
Rejecting the Second Circuit's opinion, the Supreme Court reasoned that the
denial of Treaty rights to Sumitomo did not contravene the Treaty's intent,
because the "purpose of the [FCN] Treaties was not to give foreign
corporations greater rights than domestic companies, but instead to assure
them the right to conduct business on an equal basis without suffering
discrimination based on their alienage."'
Sumitomo appeared to provide a clear resolution to the issue, by
holding Sumitomo liable under Title VII in the same manner as other
domestic employers would be. However, footnote nineteen obfuscated the
Sumitomo holding. Footnote nineteen stated:
We express no view as to whether Japanese citizenship may be
a bona fide occupational qualification for certain positions at
Sumitomo or as to whether a business necessity defense may be
available. There can be little doubt that some positions in a
Japanese controlled company doing business in the United
States call for great familiarity with not only the language of
Japan, but also the culture, customs, and business practices of
that country. However, the Court of Appeals found the
evidentiary record insufficient to determine whether Japanese
citizenship was a bona fide occupational qualification for any of
Sumitomo's positions within the reach of Article VIII(l). Nor
did it discuss the bona fide occupational qualification exception
in relation to respondents' sex discrimination claim or the
27 Id. at 180 (stating that the clear import of treaty language controls unless such application is
inconsistent with the intent behind the treaty).
2 Id. at 189-90. Both the U.S. and Japan governments supported the Court's opinion. Japan's
Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated its position that a subsidiary of a Japanese company incorporated under
U.S. (New York) law was not covered by Article VIII(I) of the FCN Treaty. Id. at 183-84 (referring to
State Department Cable, Tokyo 03300, dated Feb. 26, 1982).
29 Avagliano v. Sumitomo, 638 F.2d at 556.
30 Id.
"' Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 188-89 (emphasis added).
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possibility of a business necessity defense. Whether Sumitomo
can support its assertion of a bona fide occupational
qualification or a business necessity defense is not before us...
We also express no view as to whether Sumitomo may assert
any Article VIII(l) rights of its parent.32
The Court made no decision as to whether Japanese citizenship or sex
was a bona fide qualification exception or whether business necessity may
be available as a defense;33 thus, in footnote nineteen, the Court left open the
possibility for alternative (to FCN Article VIII) defenses. The Court also
opened the door to another potential defense when it raised the issue of
whether discrimination on the basis of citizenship would be considered
different from discrimination based on national origin,34 thus opening the
door to another potential defense. However, the Court cast doubt on the
availability of this alternative defense by reference in footnote four35 to the
plaintiffs reliance on Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co. 36 The Court
noted that "Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of citizenship
whenever it has the purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of
national origin.
37
Finally, although the Court held that a company chartered under U.S.
laws could not be a Japanese company, and therefore, could not seek
protection under the Treaty, the Court, stated in footnote nineteen that it did
not decide whether Sumitomo may assert the Article VIII rights of its
parent.3" Thus, the Court left open the possibility that a domestic subsidiary
might be permitted to claim the rights of its foreign parent. The only reason
to allow a subsidiary to claim the Treaty rights of its parent, where the
subsidiary itself had no such rights, would be a situation in which denial of
such protection would have had the effect of trampling the rights of the
parent; i.e., a situation in which the parent and the subsidiary were so closely
tied that they should be considered one entity. Therefore, it is not
unreasonable to conclude that, by suggesting the possibility that a subsidiary
might invoke its parent's rights, the Court implied the use of the doctrine of
32 Id. at 190 n.19.
33 Id.
'4 Id. at 180 n.4.
3 5 Id.
36 Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 92 (1973).
31 Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 180 n.4 (quoting Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 92).
31 Id. at 190 n. 19.
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"piercing the corporate veil"?3 9 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit Court's decision
in Fortino v. Quasar Co.,4" which relied on the language of footnote
nineteen of the Sumitomo4' case supports such a conclusion.
B. Fortino v. Quasar Co.42
In Fortino v. Quasar Co. ("Fortino"), Quasar Company ("Quasar")
was a wholly owned U.S. subsidiary of a Japanese company, Matsushita
Electric Industrial Company, Ltd. ("Matsushita").4 3  Quasar marketed
Matsushita products made in Japan, and Matsushita assigned several of its
own financial and marketing executives to Quasar on a temporary basis." In
1985, Quasar suffered a $20 million loss. Matsushita responded by sending
one of its executives, Nishikawa, to Quasar to prevent recurrence of such
losses.45 Nishikawa, who was put in charge of Quasar, instituted a reduction
of the work force, cutting half of management. 46  Fortino, Meyers, and
Schulz (Plaintiffs), who were of non-Japanese origin, were among the
Quasar executives dismissed.47 Plaintiffs, pointing to the fact that none of
the ten Japanese employees from Matsushita had been dismissed,4" charged
Quasar with discriminating against American executives on the basis of
national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.49
In the Fortino opinion, the Seventh Circuit referred to the fact that
footnote nineteen in the Sumitomo5" opinion left open the possibility that,
although the U.S. subsidiary itself was not covered by the Treaty, such
subsidiary might be able to invoke the rights of its foreign parent."' The
39 A court will "pierce the corporate veil" when a corporation and subsidiary are organized in
separate corporate form, yet operate as a single entity. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE
GROUPS 9-10 (1983).
'o Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 393 (7th Cir. 1991).
4J Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 190n.19.
'2 Fortino, 950 F.2d at 391-92.
'3 Id. at 391 (noting that Quasar Company was an unincorporated division of a U.S. corporation
wholly-owned by a Japanese company, Matsushita Electric Industrial Company, Ltd.). Quasar was created
through Matsushita's 1974 purchase of the Consumer Electronics Division of Motorola. Fortino v. Quasar
Co., 751 F. Supp. 1306, 1309 (N.D. Il. 1990).
" Fortino, 950 F.2d at 392.
45 id.
46 Id.
4 Id.
43 Two Japanese employees were rotated back to Japan and replaced by only one. Id.
" Id. Not discussed here is the claim of Plaintiff Meyers and Schultz of violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act. The Circuit Court held there was sufficient evidence of age
discrimination to constitute a jury issue, but that a new trial to determine that issue was required due to trial
error. Id.
'o Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 190 (1982).
" Fortino, 950 F.2d at 393.
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Seventh Circuit thus held, in relevant part, that Quasar, a wholly owned U.S.
subsidiary of a Japanese company, may assert the rights of its parent under
Article VIII(1) of the Treaty,52 at least to the limited extent necessary to
avoid controverting the purpose of such Treaty.5 3  The court additionally
found that Quasar did not violate Title VII's prohibition against employment
discrimination based on national origin; in reaching this decision, the court
differentiated between citizenship and national origin. 4
Judge Posner distinguished discrimination on the basis of citizenship
from that of national origin, noting that the real souce of discrimination was
Fortino's lack of Japanese citizenship and that he was not a Matsushita
employee, not his lack of Japanese ancestry.15 Given that Japan is a such a
homogenous society, there is a correlation between citizenship and national
origin, and thus, not dismissing the Japanese executives from Matsushita
may have had an effect similar to national origin discrimination. However,
as Judge Posner explained, "the treaty prevents equating the two forms of
discrimination or, what as a practical matter would amount to the same
thing, allowing the first [discrimination based on citizenship] to be used to
prove the second [discrimination based on national origin]." 6 Accordingly,
the Circuit Court dismissed the Title VII claim based on the determination
that citizenship and national origin could not be equated for employment
discrimination purposes, 7 and that the FCN Treaty prevented a contrary
decision. Thus, although Judge Posner cited altemative grounds for
dismissal of the case against Quasar, he did include the FCN Treaty as one
defense supporting his holding, stating that it was necessary to allow the
U.S. subsidiary to invoke the Treaty rights of its Japanese parent.
Interestingly, Judge Posner, in justifying his decision, stated that
prohibiting Quasar from giving preferential treatment to the Japanese
executives would have run directly against the parent, Matsushita. 58  He
further stated that such a denial to Quasar would prevent Matsushita from
" FCN Treaty, supra note 2.
13 Fortino, 950 F.2d at 393.
54 Id.
" Id. Posner explained his reasoning:
No favoritism was shown Quasar's Japanese American employees, which would have been true
national origin discrimination since they are not citizens of Japan . . . whatever his ancestry,
Fortino would have had the irremediable disability of not being an executive of Matsushita. That
was the real source of"prejudice" against him, and it is not prejudice based on national origin.
Id. 56 Id.
" However, the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the distinction of citizenship from national
origin under Title VII. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 n.4 (1982).
"a Id.
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further stated that such a denial to Quasar would prevent Matsushita from
using its own executives in preference to U.S. citizens.59 Although Judge
Posner did not expressly mention the legal basis for his assertion, it certainly
appears that he referred to disregarding the corporate entity. By stating that
forbidding Treaty rights to Quasar would be doing the same to Matsushita,
the Circuit Court suggested that the two companies should be treated as one
entity. Hence, the Circuit Court looked through the subsidiary to find that it
was one and the same as its parent; i.e., the separate corporate entity of the
subsidiary, Quasar, was disregarded. This concept of "looking through" the
subsidiary corporation to its parent is commonly referred to as "piercing the
corporate veil," and Judge Posner's opinion offered strong implications of
this legal doctrine's use in justifying his holding.
C. The Legal Theory Behind the Fortino Decision
Herman Walker, Jr., who served as Advisor on Commercial Treaties
at the State Department and who was quoted by the U.S. Supreme Court in
the Sumitomo opinion,' suggested the concept that the FCN Treaty apply
to U.S. subsidiaries of foreign parents.61  Mr. Walker stated that
application of the FCN Treaty only to branches of the foreign company
would not be sufficient protection, because one must consider the fact that
investors choose to operate abroad through subsidiaries chartered under
the laws of the foreign country.62 Although treaties normally do not apply
to such subsidiaries, Walker explained that the "'corporate veil is pierced'
for the purpose of making economic interest, rather than legal
relationship, the justification and the basis for protection."63
If "piercing the veil" is the legal theory by which a U.S. subsidiary
may claim treaty rights of its Japanese parent, then the invocation of such
rights necessarily implies that the subsidiary and the parent should be
treated as one entity (the very basis for the Circuit Court's decision in
Fortino).' Equity certainly comes into question where the U.S.
subsidiary of a foreign parent is allowed to enjoy rights as a domestic
corporation without fulfilling normally required responsibilities. When a
Japanese parent seeks to establish a business presence in the United
" Fortino, 950 F.2d at 393.
60 Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 181 n.6.
6 Walker, supra note 5, at 244.
62 Id.
63 Id.
" Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991).
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States, with the expectation that Treaty rights will apply to such business
presence, the parent has the option of installing a branch rather than a
subsidiary.
IV. JAPANESE PARENT'S CONTROL OVER THE SUBSIDIARY
A. Choice of Entity
Choosing to incorporate a subsidiary is unquestionably a deliberate
act of the parent company. U.S. protectionism is one factor which
encourages Japanese companies to establish U.S. subsidiaries. Import
quotas, transport costs, tariff liability, customer contact, and unstable
exchange rates all contribute to the decision to incorporate in the U.S. as
opposed to establishing branches.65 Furthermore, by forming a subsidiary as
a separate corporate entity, the Japanese parent limits its liability to the value
of its foreign investment. The Japanese parent is thus able to avail itself of
the benefits of incorporation.
However, as a U.S. corporation, the subsidiary is not a Japanese
company, and in accordance with Sumitomo66 is not protected by the Treaty.
If, however, American courts adopt the Fortino67 case approach, and allow
these U.S. subsidiaries to claim the Treaty rights of their Japanese parent
companies, then the parent is allowed to benefit on both ends: limited
liability and avoidance of protectionism without corporate responsibility.
Regardless, of the fairness issue, one thing is certain, even if the parent
chooses to establish a separate corporate entity in the U.S., such entity may
be disregarded where the extent of control by the parent company is so great
that the two are actually one company. This, in fact, is the case for a great
number of large, Japanese companies operating through subsidiaries in the
U.S.: between 1991 and 1993, 56.4% of Japanese foreign direct investment
has been in the form of wholly-owned subsidiaries (as of December 1997,
there were at least 520 leading U.S. corporations which were wholly-owned
by Japanese parent companies).68
65 AMES C. ABEGGLEN ET AL., THE JAPANESE CORPORATION 251-53 (1985).
Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 n.4 (1982).
67 Fortino, 950 F.2d at 389.
"' Author's research, conducted December 1997, using Corporate Affiliates, a directory database
produced by Reed Reference Publishing, a division of Reed Publishing (USA) (combines information from
the print directories Directory of Corporate Affiliations, International Directory of Corporate Affiliations,
and Directory of Leading Private Companies (although the data resulting from this search shows evidence
of control, it does not necessarily imply absolute unity or disregard of formalities)).
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B. Rotation of Employees
How do Japanese companies view their subsidiaries? An examination
of the parent's interaction with its subsidiaries reveals that the parent treats
its subsidiary similar to a branch. In many cases there is complete
ownership, leaving unquestionable control in the hands of the parent, as in
Sumitomo6 9 and Fortino.7" Further evidence of the exercise of control is the
use of the rotation system.71
In Japanese companies, internal labor shifts, i.e., rotations, are
frequently used for two primary purposes, to re-educate employees and to
allow them to experience more jobs.72 Rotation benefits the company by
ensuring that its employees, especially managers, have a better
understanding of the company's operations as a whole.73 Additionally, the
employees benefit from re-education at the company's expense." Another
characteristic of the internal rotation system is that regardless of rotation, as
long as a Japanese employee remains with the same company, his salary and
employment conditions are not changed.75 It is through this rotation system
that Japanese companies exercise management control over their U.S.
subsidiaries. This fact reflects the treatment of U.S. subsidiaries as being
part of the Japanese parent.76
The Japanese parent, through the transfer of management to its
subsidiaries, essentially exports its formula for success to its U.S. subsidiary.
Furthermore, including U.S. subsidiaries in the system of rotation, reveals
treatment of the subsidiary as part of the Japanese parent company. In the
case of production subsidiaries, plant managers are likely to be rotated to
ensure that quality and procedural standards match those of the Japanese
parent.77 In consumer and commercial electronics businesses, the transfer of
technology to a subsidiary requires a transfer of managers and experts to
maintain the parent's control over the use and development of such
' Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 176.
70 Fortino, 950 F.2d at 389.
71 Paul W. Beamish & Andrew C. Inkpen, Japanese Firms and the Decline of the Japanese
Expatriate, COLUM. J. WORLD BUS., Mar. 22, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16802180.
72 Koji MATSUMOTO, KIGYO SHUGi No KORYU [THE RISE OF THE JAPANESE CORPORATE SYSTEM:
THE INSIDE VIEW OF A MITI OFFICIAL] 133-36 (Thomas I. Elliott trans., Kegan Paul International 2d ed.
1993) (1991).
73 id.
74 id.
75 Id.
76 Fortino provides an example of this practice. Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991).
See also supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
77 TOYOHIRO KONO, STRATEGY & STRUCTURE OF JAPANESE ENTERPRISES 165 (1984).
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technology.7" There is almost complete integration between the parent and
subsidiary.7 9 In 1992, only one in three senior management positions at U.S.
subsidiaries of Japanese parent companies were non-Japanese.8 °
This rotation system, as used in the Fortino case, was a means for the
Japanese parent company, Matsushita to implement the termination of
American executives employed by the subsidiary, Quasar, which was the
basis of the Title VII claim.8' Nishikawa, a Japanese executive from
Matsushita, was rotated to Quasar and was charged with the complete
reorganization of the corporation to prevent recurrence of losses.82 Through
the rotation of Nishikawa and other executives, Matsushita, implemented its
own policies,83 and thus its control over Quasar.
V. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
Alter ego, instrumentality, puppet, shell, agent, and conduit are all
metaphors for exceptions to the protection from liability provided by the
corporate entity." Behind these metaphors are the two traditional exceptions
which may allow for piercing 1) where courts conclude that on the facts the
parent and the subsidiary corporation possess a common identity for legal
purposes, or 2) where courts regard parent and subsidiary as two companies,
but attribute the acts of one corporation to the other by the concept of
,,agency."85
As to the common identity scenario: most courts require 1) identity of
interests, and 2) that failure to pierce would cause inequitable results.86
Thus, the opponent to piercing, may still benefit from the protection of the
corporate entity so long as there is not a common identity. However, where,
as in Fortino,87 the defendant corporation has argued that not allowing it to
8 Id.
' According to a MITI survey of U.S. subsidiaries, reporting that 42 percent of all managers in
manufacturing companies and 70 percent of managers in trade companies are Japanese. Id. (citing MITI
survey).
so Jim Impoco et al., The Great Divide US.-Japanese Business Deals are Often Unable to Bridge a
Vast Culture Gap, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 6, 1992 available in 1992 WL 8934446.
sI Fortino, 950 F.2d at 392; see discussion supra notes 42-59 and accompanying text.
I Id. For further details, see Fortino v. Quasar Co., 751 F. Supp 1306, 1309-10 (N.D. III. 1990).
s3 Id.
'4 BLUMBERG, supra note 39, at 8.
Id. at 9. The agency concept is not discussed, as common identity is emphasized in the parent and
subsidiary relationship situations relevant to the topic of this paper. Additionally, and sometimes
alternatively, courts may require a finding of fraudulent use of the corporate entity or that failure to allow
piercing would produce inequitable results. See 18 AM. JUR. Corporations §§ 43, 44 (1985).
See 18 AM. JUR., supra note 85.
" Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991); see also discussion supra notes 42-59 and
accompanying text.
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invoke rights of its parent would contravene the FCN Treaty applicable to its
parent, it may be difficult to argue that there is no common identity. Where
a U.S. subsidiary and its Japanese parent company are so closely tied to the
extent that denying rights to the subsidiary would be doing the same to the
parent and where strong control has been established, there certainly appears
to be strong evidence of uniform identity and thus, a strong argument in
favor of piercing.
VI. PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIARY ISSUES CONCERNING USE OF PRIOR
PROCEEDINGS
In situations like Fortino,8 the danger of potential piercing might
prove even greater, where the basis for allowing the subsidiary to invoke its
parent's Treaty rights is an application of piercing principles.8 9 Indeed, it
may be tremendously difficult for a Japanese parent company to refute
evidence that their subsidiary was previously protected from Title VII claims
through a judgment which used piercing principles to allow the subsidiary
protection under its parent's Treaty rights. This increased danger of
piercing, however, only arises where the prior proceeding may be used
against a parent in a subsequent proceeding.
A. Collateral Estoppel
The most difficult situation for the Japanese parent company would be
one in which a court allows the use of collateral estoppel. The concept
behind collateral estoppel is preservation of the finality of judgments and
considerations of judicial economy The effect of application is preclusion
of re-litigation of an issue, such that the determination in the previous case
will be binding in the subsequent case. Generally, collateral estoppel will
apply, regardless of the correctness of the first determination of the issue, if
1) the issue was clearly decided in the prior proceedings, and 2) the issue
was necessary to the determination of the prior proceedings. 9'
Whether an issue was clearly decided is a question of finality;
therefore, if the determination was definitive it is considered final for issue
preclusion purposes.92 Specific factors used in making this determination
Fortino, 950 F.2d 389, 392.
89 See discussion supra notes 42-59 and accompanying text.
90 Montana v. U.S., 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979).
9' JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.9 (2d ed. 1993).
92 id.
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are 1) whether the decision is final not tentative, 2) the adequacy of the
hearing, and 3) the opportunity for review.93 Applying these principles in
Fortino reveals a final judgment that determined that the relationship
between the subsidiary and the parent required the same treatment under the
Treaty.94 The hearing was well litigated and reached the level of appellate
review. 95 Thus, there was a final, clear determination of the case.
Furthermore, the determination of the issue of the invocation of
Treaty rights by Quasar in Fortino96 was necessary to the determination of
the case. In fact, this was the central issue of the case, whether the
subsidiary and parent relationship was such that a court could not deny the
subsidiary the rights of its parent.
Estoppel also requires identity of issues in prior and present
proceedings. 97 Identity of issues depends on factual identity, legal standards,
and burdens of proof.98 Relevant to the parent-subsidiary issue would be
facts concerning the existence of common identity, the structure and
relationship between the two corporations. These facts were central to the
case in Fortino and they would be central to a court's decision whether to
pierce. Thus, the main inquiry remaining would likely be whether these
factors have changed between the time of the prior and present cases. But if
the proponent of piercing is able to establish that corporate structure is
generally an enduring condition, i.e., that it is not likely to change quickly,
the burden will shift to the opponent to establish changes exist. It would be
difficult to predict this outcome, where courts vary as to the necessary
burden.99
As to legal standards and burdens of proof, the outcome will depend
on the situation: there may be piercing cases brought under CERCLA,
brought by creditors or victims in product liability tort cases, etc. But, as
long as they are civil proceedings, this is not likely to prevent application of
estoppel.
Courts may also inquire as to whether the facts in both cases are
"ultimate" facts."° As to the cases regarding invocation of parent's Treaty
" Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir), cert. denied 368 U.S.
986 (1962).
" See discussion supra notes 42-59 and accompanying text.
95 Id.
96 Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991).
"7 FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 91, § 14.10 (referring to Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591,
599-600, 68 S.Ct. 715, 720 (1948)).
Id.
" Id. at 664-66 (provides examples of mental incompetence as being enduring and the extreme
metaphors of a bubble as opposed to Mount Everest).
100 Id. at 667.
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rights and "piercing," the outcomes would depend on the facts involving
common identity; therefore, the piercing proponent would likely prevail as
to this factor. But, it must be noted that some courts do not even inquire as
to ultimacy of facts.01
Problems which the proponent of piercing might face include
establishing that the issue is one of fact and not law, that the previous case
was not decided on alternate grounds, and that there is mutuality of the
parties in both cases. One factor leaning in the favor of the proponent of the
use of collateral estoppel would be that courts generally allow application in
cases of mixed law and fact issues. 2
In a case like Fortino, the legal issue was dependent on the facts, as
the determination depended on the relationship between and structure of the
companies.'0 3 Therefore, in the very least there was a mixed issue. Working
against a piercing case, there may be an argument for alternate grounds, as in
Fortino where the Circuit Court noted the distinction between national
origin and citizenship."°
Mutuality requires privity among the parties in both cases. Although
there are many views on the meaning of the mutuality requirement, one
prominent case favors the "piercing" proponent. In a California Supreme
Court case, Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust and Savings
Association,0 5 Justice Traynor stated that the proper inquiry is whether the
person against whom the estoppel was asserted was a party or in privity with
a party to the prior law suit."° Thus, in a case like that of Fortino, if a
subsequent piercing case were instituted, whether estoppel principles apply
will depend on privity between the parent and subsidiary, not on the identity
of the party or parties seeking to invoke estoppel. The concern here is
whether the parent had an interest in the prior proceeding. This appeared to
be the case in Fortino,107 where the Circuit Court stated that failure to allow
the protection of the Treaty would be equal )to denying the rights of
Matsushita, the parent company.0 8
Finally, collateral estoppel, being an equitable doctrine, may depend
on fairness as perceived by the court."' The court may inquire as to
0o RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 2, cmt. j (1982).
o FRIEDENTHAL ETAL., supra note 91, § 14.10 n.43.
103 See discussion supra notes 42-59 and accompanying text.
'o4 Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991).
o Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savs. Ass'n, 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942).
116 Id. at 895.
07 See discussion supra notes 42-59 and accompanying text.
10s Id.
o See generally 47 AM. JUR. 2d Judgments §§ 652, 650 n.79 & accompanying text (1991).
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substantive policies that might outweigh policies of judicial economy and
the avoidance of inconsistent results."0 Depending on the situation, this
may pose a barrier to the application of estoppel where international
relations and Treaty rights are concerned; however, there is the counter
argument of corporate responsibility being synonymous with protection
from liability where a subsidiary has previously hid behind the Treaty to
avoid Title VII liability.
B. Use of Prior Proceedings as Evidence
An alternative to collateral estoppel is the use of the prior pleadings,
on public record, as evidence of common identity in a subsequent piercing
case. Federal Rule of Evidence ("FRE") 807"' provides that pleadings in a
prior proceeding are made in court and under oath, and therefore, are
trustworthy." 2 This equivalent gurantee of trustworthiness provides an
exception for admission of otherwise excludable hearsay evidence. The
level of trustworthiness required is such that the proffered evidence would
be as reliable as that allowed under the other hearsay exceptions." 3 For
example, under certain circumstances, testimony from a prior proceeding
may be used as evidence, regardless of availability of the witness." 4 Part of
the rationale behind this exception is the reliability of in-court
proceedings.' Thus, the proceedings in a prior case, given the solemnity of
oath and examination of witnesses, may very well find exception under FRE
807.
The requirement of probativeness will likely prove more difficult.
Where all records and witnesses are available, a court will likely require
some exceptional circumstances in such a case." 6  However, this
IO CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4425 n.1 (1999 Supp.).
... FED. R. EVID. 807 reads as follows:
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement
is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence.
Id. 112 Id.
113 id.
"' FED. R. EvID. 803.
.. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 301 (John William Strong et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992).
1]6 Id. § 324.
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requirement does not limit the hearsay exception to essential evidence." 7
Some courts interpret this relative necessity as requiring a weighing of the
cost of obtaining alternative evidence as compared to the need for the
statement in the case."' Other courts interpret the provision to require
diligence on the party proffering the evidence. 19 Given adequate efforts, the
complexity of corporate structure, and the geographical distance from the
Japanese parent, there may indeed be a valid argument that there are
significant cost saving benefits to allowing the evidence.
As to whether the best interests of justice will be served by admission
of the evidence, such a determination will ultimately depend, not on the
preceding case, but on the reasons behind the piercing case. However, one
might keep in mind how a judge would feel about a case like Fortino and
whether this might influence his discretionary decisions.
C. Impeachment
Finally, even in the case where neither use of collateral estoppel nor
FRE 807 is allowed, there is the possibility of admission for a non-hearsay
purpose. FRE 806 allows use of hearsay to impeach the testimony of a
witness. 0 For example, if there were a piercing case involving Quasar and
Matsushita,12 testimony arguing the clear division of corporate control and
operations may be impeached by evidence from prior proceedings in which
Quasar argued that denying Treaty protection to the subsidiary was the same
as denying the rights of the parent. Examination of the prior record would
likely reveal extensive evidence of common identity (rotation of employees,
implementation of the parent's policies, arguments in the prior case, etc.),
and all this might be used for impeachment purposes against Matsushita in a
piercing case.1
22
VII. CONCLUSION
The FCN Treaty, through the protection it provides, continues to
promote international direct investment in the United States. Under the
Treaty, subsidiaries of Japanese companies incorporated under U.S. law
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 FED. R. EVID. 806.
121 See discussion supra notes 42-59 and accompanying text.
" Id.: see discussion supra notes 65-83 and accompanying text.
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receive the same rights and privileges as other domestic U.S. companies.
Problems arise, however, when Treaty rights conflict with laws requiring
corporate responsibility. Where a subsidiary of a foreign company is
granted the legal protections of the U.S. legal system, yet is able to avoid
compliance with certain laws (such as Title VII) of that same system, it
seems that such a foreign-owned corporation enjoys the best of both worlds:
limited corporate liability under domestic law and immunity from
compliance with that same domestic law under an international treaty.
Indeed, such was the case in Fortino,'23 where the Seventh Circuit Court
allowed a U.S. subsidiary of a Japanese parent company to invoke the FCN
Treaty rights of its Japanese parent company and avoid liability under Title
VII prohibition against discriminatory employment practices.'24
True, there is the argument that because the Treaty is intended to
protect the right of the Japanese parent to exercise control over its U.S.
subsidiary, Japanese parent companies must be allowed discretion in
exporting its method of management through rotation of employees from
Japan. It might also be true that such an argument may be valid in asserting
that decisions in employment are based not on race or even nationality, but
rather, that due to the homogeniety of the Japanese population and the lack
of non-Japanese employees at the parent company, there, quite simply, were
no non-Japanese employees available to be rotated to the U.S. subsidiary.
Nevetheless, as explained above, such an argument may still be vulnerable
to an assertion that discrimination on the basis of nationality (as
distinguished from race) is not an exception to Title VII.
Whatever one's opinion on the issue may be, one thing is certain; the
Fortino case opened the door for other U.S. subsidiaries of Japanese parent
companies to cite to judicial precedent favoring invocation of the Treaty.'25
However, Japanese-owned.26 subsidiaries should keep in mind that hiding
23 Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991).
124 Id.
115 Papaila v. Uniden America Corp., 51 F.3d 54, 55 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding "we agree, following
the lead of our sister circuit that has held that a subsidiary may assert the Treaty rights of the parent.").
26 Although many of the FCN Treaties include similar provisions, with language similar to U.S.-
Japan FCN Treaty Article VIII immunity, the use of the Sumitomo or Fortino (which relied on the
ambiguous footnote 19 of Sumitomo), cases as precedent may prove problematic, as the U.S. Supreme
Court in Sumitomo stated that its analysis was restricted to the U.S.- Japan FCN Treaty and did not
necessarily apply to "other Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties which, although similarly
worded, may have different negotiating histories." Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176,
185 n.12, 102 S.Ct. 2374 (1982). However, despite the Sumitomo Court's stated restriction on the
application of Sumitomo as precedent, Fortino was cited in a case involving the U.S.-France FCN Treaty
to avoid the provisions of Title VII. See, e.g., W.G. Bennett v. Total Minatome Corp., 138 F.3d 1053 (5th
Cir. 1998) (permitting a U.S. subsidiary of a French corporation to assert U.S.-France FCN Treaty rights
as a defense to avoid enforcement of Title VII provisions as to discrimination in favor of French citizens).
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behind the shield of the FCN Treaty may lead to the disregard of the
corporate entity, which would likely prove costly to the parent company.
If the situation were to arise, in which a successful claim is made
against a U.S. subsidiary of a Japanese parent company (e.g., by a creditor or
a plaintiff in a tort claim), and the subsidiary is unable to pay, the existence
of prior proceedings, in which the subsidiary claimed common identity to
justify the use of its parent's Treaty rights to escape Title VII liability, may
prove problematic to both the subsidiary and the parent. In a case where
piercing of the the subsidiary's corporate veil is sought, prior assertions, by
such subsidiary, of common identity might be used effectively to refute any
of the subsidiary's arguments against piercing, and thus place unlimited
liability on the parent for claims against the subsidiary. The use of collateral
estoppel might preclude any re-litigation of the issue of uniform identity
between parent and subsidiary.'27 Alternatively, the prior pleadings of the
subsidiary that it was inseparable from its Japanese parent company might
be used as evidence of common identity.'28 Additionally, even in the event
that the subsidiary is able to overcome the use collateral estoppel and prior
pleadings as evidence, prior pleadings by the subsidiary claiming common
identity might be used to impeach any testimony to the contrary.'29
In cases, such as Fortino,130 where a U.S. subsidiary of a Japanese
company seeks protection under Treaty rights of the parent, such subsidiary
may make a necessary, and possibly inadvertent argument for the existence
of common identity (and thus for the application of piercing the corporate
veil). Although the concern about liability under U.S. domestic law may
appear most important (and definitely more immediate) at the time, the
Japanese parent company should be aware that arguments made by the
subsidiary might increase the potential danger of future successful piercing
cases aimed at the parent. Therefore, Japanese parent companies should
encourage their subsidiaries to weigh potential losses in a Title VII suit
against the potential risks and costs of piercing (as well as alternative
grounds for defense) before deciding to argue Treaty rights apply, especially
where the subsidiary is already in a financially precarious situation.
2 See discussion supra notes 90-110 and accompanying text.
2 See discussion supra notes 110-119 and accompanying text
29 See discussion suprai notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
' 0 Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991).
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